The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review
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The Authoritarian Security Apparatus : Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command. / Gläßel, Christian; González, Belén; Scharpf, Adam.
Research Handbook on Authoritarianism. ed. / Natasha Lindstaedt ; Jeroen J.J. den Bosch. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024. p. 111–126.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review
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TY - CHAP
T1 - The Authoritarian Security Apparatus
T2 - Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command
AU - Gläßel, Christian
AU - González, Belén
AU - Scharpf, Adam
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - This chapter discusses the fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty in the authoritarian security apparatus. Research suggests that the survival of autocracies and dictatorships hinges on loyal security officers. However, the management of regime security also requires skills and competence, which officers may use to oust the very regime they pledged to protect. The chapter highlights the importance of command experience as a key ingredient to successful officer careers. It then explains how autocrats use command posts to generate loyalty among competent officers. Employing original data on an entire officer corps, it illustrates the dual logic of officer selection and placement at work in Argentina’s last dictatorship. The regime assigned skilled officers to field positions and co-opted those with uncertain loyalties by placing them close to their home regions. The chapter concludes by highlighting avenues for future research.
AB - This chapter discusses the fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty in the authoritarian security apparatus. Research suggests that the survival of autocracies and dictatorships hinges on loyal security officers. However, the management of regime security also requires skills and competence, which officers may use to oust the very regime they pledged to protect. The chapter highlights the importance of command experience as a key ingredient to successful officer careers. It then explains how autocrats use command posts to generate loyalty among competent officers. Employing original data on an entire officer corps, it illustrates the dual logic of officer selection and placement at work in Argentina’s last dictatorship. The regime assigned skilled officers to field positions and co-opted those with uncertain loyalties by placing them close to their home regions. The chapter concludes by highlighting avenues for future research.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Military
KW - Deployment
KW - Repression
KW - Coup
KW - Co-optation
KW - Argentina
UR - http://t.co/lMVQaCTsmT
U2 - 10.4337/9781802204827
DO - 10.4337/9781802204827
M3 - Book chapter
SN - 9781802204810
SP - 111
EP - 126
BT - Research Handbook on Authoritarianism
A2 - Lindstaedt , Natasha
A2 - den Bosch, Jeroen J.J.
PB - Edward Elgar Publishing
CY - Cheltenham
ER -
ID: 388371221