Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative. / Ortín, Ignacio Ortuño; Schultz, Christian.

Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2012.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Ortín, IO & Schultz, C 2012 'Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative' Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Ortín, I. O., & Schultz, C. (2012). Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative. Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Ortín IO, Schultz C. Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative. Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2012.

Author

Ortín, Ignacio Ortuño ; Schultz, Christian. / Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative. Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2012.

Bibtex

@techreport{f1269c7c6ce1433b96377f27064e15fd,
title = "Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative",
abstract = "The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties’ candidates and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria, it is shown that more pub- lic funding leads parties to chose more moderate candidates, and that an increase in the funding’s dependence on vote shares induces fur- ther moderation and improves welfare. If parties are asymmetric, vote share dependent public funding bene…ts the large party and makes it moderate its candidate, while the smaller party reacts by choosing a more extremist candidate. On balance, however, if the parties are not too asymmetric, an increase in vote share dependent funding improves welfare and increases the likelihood that a moderate candidate wins the election",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, political economy, Parties, Public Funding, Informative Advertising, Campaign Finance",
author = "Ort{\'i}n, {Ignacio Ortu{\~n}o} and Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL classification: JEL: D72, D78, D82",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
publisher = "Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative

AU - Ortín, Ignacio Ortuño

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL classification: JEL: D72, D78, D82

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties’ candidates and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria, it is shown that more pub- lic funding leads parties to chose more moderate candidates, and that an increase in the funding’s dependence on vote shares induces fur- ther moderation and improves welfare. If parties are asymmetric, vote share dependent public funding bene…ts the large party and makes it moderate its candidate, while the smaller party reacts by choosing a more extremist candidate. On balance, however, if the parties are not too asymmetric, an increase in vote share dependent funding improves welfare and increases the likelihood that a moderate candidate wins the election

AB - The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties’ candidates and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria, it is shown that more pub- lic funding leads parties to chose more moderate candidates, and that an increase in the funding’s dependence on vote shares induces fur- ther moderation and improves welfare. If parties are asymmetric, vote share dependent public funding bene…ts the large party and makes it moderate its candidate, while the smaller party reacts by choosing a more extremist candidate. On balance, however, if the parties are not too asymmetric, an increase in vote share dependent funding improves welfare and increases the likelihood that a moderate candidate wins the election

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - political economy

KW - Parties

KW - Public Funding

KW - Informative Advertising

KW - Campaign Finance

M3 - Working paper

BT - Public funding of political parties when campaigns are informative

PB - Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 38557081