Political Budget Cycles

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEncyclopedia chapterResearchpeer-review

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Political Budget Cycles. / Aaskoven, Lasse; Lassen, David Dreyer.

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017. (Oxford Research Encyclopedia).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEncyclopedia chapterResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Aaskoven, L & Lassen, DD 2017, Political Budget Cycles. in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Oxford Research Encyclopedia. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.163

APA

Aaskoven, L., & Lassen, D. D. (2017). Political Budget Cycles. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oxford Research Encyclopedia https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.163

Vancouver

Aaskoven L, Lassen DD. Political Budget Cycles. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2017. (Oxford Research Encyclopedia). https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.163

Author

Aaskoven, Lasse ; Lassen, David Dreyer. / Political Budget Cycles. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017. (Oxford Research Encyclopedia).

Bibtex

@inbook{4251d2f5c5f5402d97e868af7dab1f81,
title = "Political Budget Cycles",
abstract = "The political budget cycle—how elections affect government fiscal policy—is one of the most studied subjects in political economy and political science. The key theoretical question is whether incumbent governments can time or structure public finances in ways that improve their chances of reelection; the key empirical question is whether this in fact happens. The incentives of incumbents to engage in such electioneering are governed by political institutions, observability of political choices, and their consequences, as well as voter knowledge, and both theoretical and empirical studies on political budget cycles have recently focused on conditions under which such cycles are likely to obtain. Much recent research focuses on subnational settings, allowing comparisons of governments in similar institutional environments, and a consensus on the presences of cycles in public finances—and in the reporting of public finances—is beginning to emerge.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, political budget cycles, political business cycles, elections, political economy, fiscal policy",
author = "Lasse Aaskoven and Lassen, {David Dreyer}",
note = "Online publication date Apr. 2017",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.163",
language = "English",
series = "Oxford Research Encyclopedia",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
booktitle = "Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - ENCYC

T1 - Political Budget Cycles

AU - Aaskoven, Lasse

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

N1 - Online publication date Apr. 2017

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - The political budget cycle—how elections affect government fiscal policy—is one of the most studied subjects in political economy and political science. The key theoretical question is whether incumbent governments can time or structure public finances in ways that improve their chances of reelection; the key empirical question is whether this in fact happens. The incentives of incumbents to engage in such electioneering are governed by political institutions, observability of political choices, and their consequences, as well as voter knowledge, and both theoretical and empirical studies on political budget cycles have recently focused on conditions under which such cycles are likely to obtain. Much recent research focuses on subnational settings, allowing comparisons of governments in similar institutional environments, and a consensus on the presences of cycles in public finances—and in the reporting of public finances—is beginning to emerge.

AB - The political budget cycle—how elections affect government fiscal policy—is one of the most studied subjects in political economy and political science. The key theoretical question is whether incumbent governments can time or structure public finances in ways that improve their chances of reelection; the key empirical question is whether this in fact happens. The incentives of incumbents to engage in such electioneering are governed by political institutions, observability of political choices, and their consequences, as well as voter knowledge, and both theoretical and empirical studies on political budget cycles have recently focused on conditions under which such cycles are likely to obtain. Much recent research focuses on subnational settings, allowing comparisons of governments in similar institutional environments, and a consensus on the presences of cycles in public finances—and in the reporting of public finances—is beginning to emerge.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - political budget cycles

KW - political business cycles

KW - elections

KW - political economy

KW - fiscal policy

U2 - 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.163

DO - 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.163

M3 - Encyclopedia chapter

T3 - Oxford Research Encyclopedia

BT - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - Oxford

ER -

ID: 177380957